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ReIlDZJOUS WITH ReALITY
TI ULTIMATE
QUESTION FOR TI+C LAW
GOCS BEYOND
"WI-AT IS COM PETCNCY?"
T KESPOT WE'RE IN
FORCCS
TICE QUESTION:
COM PETEINCY
FOR WIAT?
Educators and practitioners are engaged in a debate
in which suspicion of each other's motives plays a
large part.
The practitioners are angry that the law schools
seem so unconcerned about the practical skills of
their graduates; the law schools fear that the multi-
plication of requirements will rigidify the law cur-
riculum and intrude into academic policy that should
be governed by law faculty.
So long as we eye each other with suspicion, with-
out addressing the underlying premises and the
fundamental issues, the debate will continue to be
unenlightening. How can both groups address them-
selves to the really serious questions: What do we
mean when we talk of "lawyer competence?" Can
we design reliable techniques for measuring the
elements of "lawyer competence" once they are
identified?
I must admit to a personal distaste for the vocation-
al school tone of some of the rhetoric we have heard
from practicing lawyers on this issue. Law school
should not be viewed as a dull and boring obstacle
course through which one has to pass in order to be
admitted to the practice of law. Memorization of
equitable maxims or the law of bailments for regur-
gitation on bar examinations cannot be the full story
of law school. The life of the spirit that must be an
important part of the process of legal education oozes
out entirely in such an approach.
I was struck, in this connection, that during the
entire time that eligibility requirements and lawyer
competency were being discussed at the CLEPR work- :
shop, there wasn't a single reference to the ideas and
values with which law schools and the legal order must
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be concerned. Throughout a very long day of discus-
sion, the word "justice" wasn't mentioned even once!
What are law schools all about? Law schools should
be concerned above all with central concepts such as
power, order and justice. How can we achieve the
minimum degree of order we need in society? How can
we enhance the quality of justice in our society? How
can we control and channel official power . . and
what do these words mean? Surely these questions are
related to the qualities of a legal system and to the
competence of the lawyers who work within it.
Thus, practitioners should not be surprised that the
"nuts and bolts" quality of some of the discussion of
lawyer competency gives rise to concern among
academics, who fear an effort to convert educational
institutions with multiple goals into trade schools with
a single goal.
And, with fears and suspicions on both sides, we
don't communicate well with each other. Until we
can start talking with greater sophistication and
humility about what we mean by lawyer competence
and how we will measure it, I am afraid that our
discourse will only increase the polarization of views
that already exists.
EVALUATING CLEPR'S INFLUENCE
Let me now turn to a few observations concerning
some significant changes, not generally noted, that
are going on in legal education today. First, what
about the progress of clinical legal education?
If the trustees of CLEPR took at face value the
startling statistics of Gordon Gee (that less than three
percent of student credit hours in American law
schools involve clinical education) and the assessment
of Bob Oliphant (that clinical educators are a small
group of outsiders on American faculties who desire
to move into traditional teaching roles of greater
status), you might conclude that CLEPR's efforts to
further the development of clinical education have
been a waste of money. The time might as well have
been spent in distributing copies of the Koran in the
Bible Belt.
But you should not take these assessments at face
value. The effect of the movement toward more reality
in legal education, toward "learning by doing," can't
be judged solely by the proportion of credit hours or
of teachers devoted to clinical education. The at-
torney-client relationship has become much more
central to all of legal education, even in courses that
are not denominated as "clinical."
Moreover, CLEPR uses a definition of clinical that,
because it requires dealing with a live client, is very
narrow. Law students are increasingly exposed to
exercises and simulations that provide them with
lawyer skills of great consequence and practicality.
These techniques are forcing students to integrate
the theory and doctrine of the intellectual side of law
school with the real-world problems encountered by
lawyers. The trends which have been fostered by
CLEPR's efforts are winning widespread acceptance,
despite the difficult resource problems that law
schools face today.
The movement toward "learning by doing" in legal
education is part of a process of planned change.
CLEPR has promoted it, every law faculty discusses
it and curriculum and appointment decisions are
made quite deliberately to provide increased oppor-
tunities for its integration into the law curriculum.
A PATTERN OF STEP BY STEP CHANGE
Meanwhile, however, a series of unplanned incre-
mental changes in legal education are occurring,
despite the lack of notice or publicity.
One important unplanned development is that law
schools, especially those in metropolitan areas, are
becoming part-time institutions after the first year.
Data compiled at a number of law schools by Bob
Stevens indicate very clearly that the energy and at-
tention devoted to law study on the part of many
students fall off very sharply in the second and third
years.
Some of them, of course, are engaged in work
experiences that are relevant to legal education such
as law office research, judicial clerkships or legal work
with government agencies. Even work as an insurance
adjuster or court clerk can provide information and
know-how that is valuable to the would-be lawyer.
Perhaps the law schools have moved to an apprentice-
ship model without even knowing it.
The important point here is that this change is
going on, that it has important consequences for legal
education and that we know very little about it. Many
law students are taking full-time programs but are
delivering only part-time effort to their studies. Some-
thing has to give.
The second major unplanned change in legal edu-
cation concerns the decline of the socratic method.
The accepted folklore is that the socratic method
comes close to being the only pedagogical technique
in law school. That is not true, and it never was true.
Some basic courses have always been taught by lec-
turers, and problem-method techniques have been
used in advanced courses and seminars for many
years.
But the relative sway of socratic teaching is
diminishing and, in some schools, dialectical teaching
all but disappears after the first year. We lack firm
evidence, but the impressionistic report of many
faculty members at a number of different law schools
confirms this decline.
BUT IT JUST ISN'T DONE
An anecdote illustrates the trend. A younger faculty
member at a fine law school, who opposes the socratic
method himself because of the alleged anxiety it
produces in law students, reported to me the result
of a curriculum survey he had performed at his law
school.
After sitting in a number of classes of different
instructors and questioning a great many students,
he reported that only one first-year teacher used the
socratic method in its undiluted, old-fashioned form.
A few others partially relied on it in a gentler form.
Even more startling was his report that not a single
teacher at the school used the socratic method in
second- and third-year courses.
Support for his conclusions was evidenced by
student reaction to a visitor from another law school
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who attempted to use dialectical techniques in a large
second-year course.
A petition signed by many members of the class and
delivered by a substantial delegation informed him
that such methods weren't used at the law school, and
that it was an invasion of the students' privacy to
expect them always to be prepared or to call on them
in class. Many of them had jobs in the city and they
were doing lots of other things; expecting them to be
present and to respond to questions was an impair-
ment of their personal and intellectual freedoms.
Apparently, the teacher's job is to be entertaining
and interesting and to tell them what he knows about
the subject matter of the course. The "paper chase"
has become the "puffball chase."
This is an extreme picture and it is drawn so with
a purpose. I know this anecdotal evidence doesn't
establish the fact that a major and dramatic change
in law school teaching methods has occurred. But I
want to arouse you to think about the possibility that
it has and to investigate the facts. Assume for the
moment that I am right and ask why this change has
occurred.
Three possible factors are worth mentioning. Frank
Allen identified one when he talked about the loss of
confidence on the part of law teachers. George Bunn
reinforced the point. Law teachers are more uncertain
today about what they are teaching and why, and the
uncertainty carries over to teaching methods.
Second is the growth of consumerism in higher
education. Students are more critical of the educa-
tional process and they communicate their views with
considerable vigor. That is desirable-but why are
faculties so responsive to the whims and fads of each
class of students?
Faculty members used to resist student consum-
erism because they thought they knew what they were
doing. Now, lacking that certainty, they tend to
respond to student pressures which have existed for
years: pressures to "lay it out" in an entertaining and
easily absorbed fashion. And lecturing is what
students are increasingly getting, day by day, in law
schools all over the country.
Does this result in less analysis on the part of the
students? Is the change compensated for by the higher
average intelligence of today's law students? Has the
change affected the tone and quality of legal educa-
tion? I don't know the answers to these questions.
A third explanation may lie in changing student
attitudes and characteristics. Law students today have
quick intellects but their staying power in sustained
analysis is often suspect. They are much more sen-
sitive to questioning and tend to view a teacher's com-
ments in a subjective and personal manner.
I have been astonished, for example, at the number
of students who think teachers, by asking them ques-
tions or holding them to high standards, are engaged
in an effort to humiliate them.
A generation ago, when we went to law school, how
many of you thought that the advancement of under-
standing through the inductive learning of the ques-
tioning process was designed to embarrass or humili-
ate you? Yet that is a prevalent reaction today even to
dialectical discourse that is much more gentle than
was characteristic of our time.
There is a fear, at least on the part of some of the
crusty, socratic teachers I know, that the kind of
hard-nosed, analytical and disciplined thinking which
the best law schools used to pride themselves on teach-
ing is no longer a shared experience of all law
students. Some members of this diminishing frater-
nity of law teachers believe that now, more than ever,
there is a question of the competency of many law
students to handle fundamental analytical skills. They
worry about the tendency of many students to become
impatient with multi-faceted, many-layered legal
problems and to want to leap to intuitive conclusions.
If you push law students with a problem that requires
sustained analysis, these law teachers report that "the
response ain't what it used to be."
A TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY
While I am in a gloomy and dyspeptic frame of mind,
let me conclude with some remarks about the relation-
ship of the law school to the general society. Trends
in our society place great strain on the law and, at the
same time, give it less credence. The old verities are
gone and new ones have not taken their place.
The decline of the family and other informal in-
stitutions of value-inculcation and social control lead
the public to place heavier emphasis on legal tech-
niques to provide social direction and control. Yet the
general deterioration of respect for authority under-
mines the ability of the law to command respect and
obedience.
What is the proper role of law in a society in which
instant gratification seems to be a major goal? Some
years ago it was thought that there was a close rela-
tionship between public and private morality and
between crime and sin.
Today the concept of sin has disappeared from
sight; crime is viewed more as the responsibility of the
society rather than of the individual. Society, by
exposing individuals to unhealthy environments, is
responsible for predisposing them toward criminal
behavior, which is merely a form of social illness.
To the modern lawyer, the First Amendment comes
closest to being the one remaining verity. That is a
pretty slim foundation on which to build a moral com-
munity which is dependent upon commonly-held
values.
Today the dilemma for the lawyer and the law
school is not merely to define "What is competency?"
There is also the question, "Competency for what?"
What kind of society do we want? What values and
goals should the lawyer serve? In a society which is
witness to the escalation of group conflict, we are sure
to get more lawyers of the hired-gun variety who are
better and better at stinging their opponents. I
wonder whether law schools and the universities of
which they are part do not need to penetrate the
utilitarian and instrumental thinking that now totally
pervades all of society, but especially higher educa-
tion, and to ask more penetrating questions about
values. We will escape our current confusion and
malaise only if we redirect our moral compass and
regain a sense of direction. L
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